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Statement of Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction is correct pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j). 
Statement of Issues 
Is there a breach of contract when one party (B) commits intentional torts 
against the other party (A), injuring party A's right to enjoyment of the 
contract? 
Is there a breach of good faith and fair dealing when one party (B) commits 
intentional tort upon intentional tort against the other party (A), injuring 
party A's right to enjoyment of the contract? 
Is not the duty to abide by the laws of the land so as to not interfere with a 
person's right to enjoy the fruits of the contract implicit in any contract? 
Does not the trial court's holding - that a party to a contract can break the 
laws of the land to interfere with a contract, simply because the contract 
does not forbid it - set a dangerous precedent? 
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Standard of Review 
Standard of Review for each issue is set forth in St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp.: 
When determining whether a trial court properly granted a rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to 
be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Colman 
v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990); Lowe v. 
Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989). In light of the 
standard of review, we state the facts in a light most favorable to the 
party against which the rule 12(b)(6) motion was brought. See State v. 
Verde, 110 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989). Because the propriety of a 
12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, we give the trial court's ruling 
no deference [**3] and review it under a correctness standard. Lowe, 
779 P.2d at 669 (citing Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 131 P.2d 
225, 229 (Utah 1987); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 
1985)). 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-203. Obligation of good faith 
"Every contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in 
its performance or enforcement." 
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Statement of the Case 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is a breach of contract case arising out of appellee's commission 
of intentional torts against appellant, injuring appellant's right to enjoyment 
of the contract. The injury and suffering arising out of the commission of 
said torts has become so great that appellant maintains a breach of contract 
exists. 
II. Course of proceedings 
Appellee filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
III. Trial Court Disposition 
Trial court gave the motion to dismiss to the appellee stating the 
contract did not forbid appellee from committing torts against appellant and 
reasoned that a contract can not be enlarged to included terms not included 
in the original contract. 
Trial court referred to the torts as "harassment" by the appellee's 
police and completely overlooked the other torts committed by the non-
police in arriving at its decision. 
Appellant filed a motion to reconsider and a motion to amend the 
complaint. Neither were allowed. 
IV. Statement of Facts 
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Appellant is an alumnus of BYU. 
Starting in 1993 appellant was subjected to questionable and harassing 
treatment by appellee's BYU police. 
Appellant was subsequently subjected to a false arrest in 1997 which 
was admitted to be false by its general counsel. Appellant sued. Appellee 
settled agreeing to allow appellant to sign up and take 10 classes for free 
during spring and summer term over a 10 year period. That said contract 
(Appendix A) exists is not in dispute. 
Despite the court settlement and assurances from appellee that the 
conduct of the BYU police would cease, the conduct did not cease. Said 
conduct towards of the BYU police is motivated by ill-will. 
Subsequent to the court settlement, appellee continued to commit torts 
against appellant in the form of two (2) defamatory articles published by the 
school newspaper, the first admittedly was a fabricated police beat story of 
and concerning appellant wherein the police told the student body and other 
readers, without basis, to "use caution" around appellant. The VP of student 
life required a retraction article to be published 3 months later. 
The second defamatory article stated appellant had been convicted of 
criminal trespassing which was false. 
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Appellee's police detained, in violation of the 4 and 14 
amendments, appellant on numerous occasion without cause on and off 
campus. 
Appellant returned to BYU as a student spring '02. The latter 2 false 
imprisonments occurred when appellant was a student attending class at 
BYU during 2002. 
The BYU police supervise the security guards and showed them a 
picture of appellant and told them to report him on sight. One student 
security guard obliged and the police came and detained (false imprisoned) 
appellant. This occurred in spite of the fact that appellant was a student 
there and had done nothing illegal. (Walking through the hall of an open 
building) 
Subsequently, police issued an advisory to the chemistry building to 
report appellant on site and appellant was false imprisoned, not being 
allowed to leave, until the officer called to the scene spoke at length with the 
appellant. This occurred despite the fact appellant was a student there and 
despite the appellant not having violated any rule or law. 
Further, it was frustrating to the appellant to have to be subjected to 
the torts, said injury resulting from these torts being complicated by the 
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memory of the false arrest and sexual assault on appellant. Moreover, the 
police specifically singled appellant out for these false imprisonments. 
The most blatant abuse heaped upon appellant while a student there 
was when a security guard, supervised by the BYU police, approached a 
classmate in appellant's Computer Science 460 class spring 2002, said 
classmate being a former roommate and friend, and began telling classmate 
ten things that police dispatch read to him concerning appellant, each item 
being confidential and sensitive information generally not given out without 
a specialized request. Said information was highly damaging to the 
friendship of appellant and former roommate and was extremely upsetting to 
say the least. It interfered with appellants coursework, ability to study, and 
appellant was so upset he could not take the final exam in the same room 
with the former roommate and ended up taking the exam 2 hrs. prior to the 
final exam by permission of the professor. Subsequently, former roommate 
would not work in the same lab as appellant. 
Appellant believes that the police are singling him out for such 
treatment and likely is due to the settlement that vindicated appellant in the 
false arrest incident. 
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Appellant was so shook up by the incidents along with the long 
history of abuse by the appellee towards him that he maintains a breach of 
good faith and fair dealing in contract exists. 
Summary of the Argument 
Appellant's right to enjoy the fruits of the contract was injured by the 
appellees's intentional torts against Appellant, and the criteria outlined in for 
breach of good faith and fair dealing in St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp. is satisfied. 
Detail of the Argument 
I. Good Faith and Fair Dealing Criteria 
The criteria for a breach of good faith and fair dealing is set forth in 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co.: 
In this state, a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most, 
if not all, contractual relationships. See, e.g., Beck v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985). ... Under the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, each party impliedly promises that he will not 
intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the 
other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract. Bastian v. 
Cedar Hills Investment & Land Co., 632 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah 1981); 
Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979). A violation of the 
covenant gives rise to a claim for breach of contract. Beck, 701 P.2d at 
798. 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co., at 200. 
It appears then that a breach of good faith and fair dealing occurs 
when a 1) party to a contract 2) (a) intentionally or (b) purposely does 
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anything which will 3) (a) destroy or (b) injure 4) the other party's right 5) to 
receive the fruits of the contract. St. Benedict's Dev. Co., at 200. Each of 
these are in turn analyzed in light of the facts of the case at bar. 
II. Good Faith and Fair Dealing Criteria applied to the instant case 
A. Party to a Contract 
Appellee is a party to a contract at center of this case. See Appendix 
A - Settlement Agreement. 
B. Intentionally or purposely does anything 
The torts committed by the appellee against appellant are intentional 
acts. See Amended Complaint (Appendix D) False Imprisonment fflj 28 (a), 
(c); 29 (b), (c); Defamation ffif 13-20,22-26 ; Breach of Confidentiality ffif 
31-33; Civil Rights Violations ffif 28 (a), (c); 29 (b), (c) , 13-20, 22-26, 31-
33; Family Education and Right to Privacy Act violations <[fl| 22-26, 31-33; 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress fflf 13-20, 22-26, 31-33. See 
Complaint (Appendix B) False Imprisonment f 29 (b), (c); Defamation ^ 
13-21,22-26 ; Breach of Confidentiality If 31-33; Civil Rights Violations ffi[ 
29 (b), (c), 13-20, 22-26, 31-33; Family Education and Right to Privacy Act 
violations | | 22-26, 31-33; Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress fflf 
13-20, 22-26, 31-33. See also Prosser, Wade & Schwartz's, Torts, 10th 
edition, (2001) (false imprisonment is an intentional tort, Id. pp. 37-47; 
10 
defamation (an intentional tort and libel per se as alleged in the 
complaint/amended complaint; defamation requires a purposeful act) is a 
tort, Id. pp. 833-936; Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Id. pp. 47-
63; breach of confidentiality (as alleged in the complaint/amended 
complaint) resulted from purposeful acts, Id. pp. 954-958). 
Additionally, appellant has alleged these acts were intentional. See 
Amended Complaint (Appendix D) ^[ 43-47; See Complaint (Appendix B) 
1H 43-47. 
C. Which will destroy or injure 
Torts injure. The word tort derives from (in part) the French word 
tort, which means injury or wrong. Torts, id at p. 1. Appellant has alleged 
that the torts committed by the appellee have indeed injured appellant. See 
Amended Complaint (Appendix D) fflf 7, 8, 21, 26, 32-33, 35, 37; See 
Complaint (Appendix B) fflf 7, 8, 21, 26, 32-33, 35, 37. 
In injuring appellant, his right to enjoy the contract is injured. 
D. The other party's 
Appellant is the other party to the contract. See Appendix A -
Settlement Agreement. 
E. Right to receive the fruits of the contract 
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Being party to the contract appellant has a right to receive the fruits of 
the contract. 
The fruits of the contract in this case is the right to attend appellee's 
place of business for educational purposes free from injury caused by torts 
being committed against him by appellee. The academic environment 
requires some degree of solitude and should be a place where a student can 
concentrate on their studies free from torts and the fear of torts being 
committed upon them. 
Appellant argues that obedience to the laws of the land so as to not 
interfere with a party's enjoyment of the contract is implicit in every 
contract. The trial court, in its Ruling (Appendix C) and , implicitly has held 
that a party to a contract can break the laws of the land - when such language 
to prohibit the breaking the laws of the land is not explicitly in the contract -
and can break the laws of the land as such to get out of the contract. Such a 
holding is unwise. (The trial court was able to do this by characterizing the 
torts as harassment - discussed below) 
Appellant has been defamed by appellee on two occasions which 
damaged his reputation among the student body and faculty, caused 
emotional distress and injured and damaged the fruits of the contract and the 
enjoyment thereof. 
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Appellant has been singled of by appellee's police for false 
imprisonment on numerous occasions. This has injured the right to benefit 
from the contract as Appellant does not want to suffer tort against him 
simply by being on campus. 
Appellant has had violation of confidentiality committed by a security 
guard who works under the police approaching a classmate, former 
roommate and friend in a computer lab and beginning a character attack on 
appellant, highly disrupting appellant's ability to study and succeed in his 
schoolwork. 
Appellant's right to the benefits of the contract has therefore been 
injured. 
III. Acts of the appellee constitute torts 
A. False Imprisonment 
False Imprisonment occurs when a defendant intentionally confines 
another person against their wishes and the person being confined is aware 
of the confinement. 
Appellant was confined against his wishes by appellee and was aware 
of the confinement. See Amended Complaint (Appendix D) %% 29 (b), (c); 
See Complaint (Appendix B) | f 29 (b), (c). 
Appellee had no legal basis for the false imprisonment. 
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B. Defamation 
Defamation occurs when a defendant publishes false information to 
another, of and concerning the plaintiff, tending to cause damage to the 
reputation of the plaintiff. 
Appellant was defamed by a fabricated police beat article printed in 
appellee's newspaper. Said article was of and concerning appellant, was 
false, and tended to damage the reputation of the appellant. See Amended 
Complaint (Appendix D) fflj 13-20; See Complaint (Appendix B) fflf 13-20. 
When a student's reputation is damaged in the eyes of fellow peers it harms 
the educational experience. 
Appellant was defamed (libel per se) in an internet article printed by 
appellee's newspaper stating appellant had been convicted for criminal 
trespassing when in fact he had not been. See Amended Complaint 
(Appendix D) ffi[ 22-26; See Complaint (Appendix B) fflj 22-26. 
C. Breach of Confidentiality 
Breach of Confidentiality is actionable at common law. See Prosser, 
Wade & Schwartz's, Torts, 10th edition, (2001) p. 954. 
Appellant had confidential information (police information, school 
disciplinary information) given out to a classmate and former roommate and 
friend with no legal basis for so doing and against governmental and school 
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policy. Said information being given out injured appellant. See Amended 
Complaint (Appendix D) ffl[ 31-33; See Complaint (Appendix B) ffl[ 31-33. 
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires four elements: 
(1) The conduct must be intentional or reckless; 
(2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous; 
(3) There must be a casual connection between the wrongful conduct and 
the emotional distress; 
(4) The emotional distress must be severe. 
The acts of defamation were either intentional or reckless; the acts were 
outrageous and likely considered extreme; there was a casual connection 
between the conduct and distress; the distress was severe. 
The Breach of Confidentiality was an intentional act and reckless; it 
disregarded the high likelihood that appellant would overhear the 
conversation or be told of the conversation by the classmate; the acts were 
outrageous and likely considered extreme; there was a casual connection 
between the conduct and distress; the distress was severe. 
In noting that the distress was severe, appellant did not need medical etc. 
attention. Medical effects are not necessary to it to be actionable however. It 
was severe enough to cause severe emotional distress to appellant and 
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appellant could not take the final exam as scheduled. Further there was a 
loss of friendship. 
See Amended Complaint (Appendix D) f^ f 13-20, 22-26, 31-33; 
Complaint (Appendix B) fflf 13-20, 22-26, 31-33 for the events leading to the 
emotional distress. 
E. Civil Rights 
1. Appellant does not give up his constitutional rights by attending 
appellee's school. The U.S. Supreme court has held: 
The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use 
by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed 
by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it. 
Marsh v. Alabama , 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946). 
2. Unreasonable Seizure - 4 Amend. U.S. Constitution. 
While a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment simply 
by approaching an individual in a public place and asking him questions, the 
individual "need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline 
to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way." Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
The U.S. Supreme court has also held: 
In contrast, a much different situation prevailed in Brown v. Texas, 
443 U.S. 47 (1979), when two policemen physically detained the 
defendant to determine his identity, after the defendant refused the 
officers1 request to identify himself. The Court held that absent some 
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reasonable suspicion of misconduct, the detention of the defendant to 
determine his identity violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment 
right to be free from an unreasonable seizure. Id., at 52. 
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 
In each of the unreasonable seizure incidents, appellee was acting 
under color of state law. See Amended Complaint (Appendix D) ^ 29 (b), 
(c) []; Complaint (Appendix D) ffl[ 29 (b), (c). 
In each incident appellant was detained against his wishes by the 
appellee police when no reasonable suspicion or basis for so doing existed. 
Further, appellant was singled out for the detainment, asking non-police 
BYU employees to report appellant on sight, this in spite of appellant being 
a student. 
3. Denial of Equal Protection of Laws - 14 Amend. U.S. 
Constitution. 
The U.S. Supreme court has held that a "class of one95 is a 
recognizable class Denial of Equal Protection of Laws purposes. 
Willowbrookv. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000). 
Other students similarly situated are not singled out for false 
imprisonment, defamatory articles or have security approach their 
classmates and start a character assault on them. 
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Appellant has alleged (or can amend the pleadings) sufficiently to 
show that he has been singled out for treatment in the form of torts that 
others similarly situated do not suffer. Further the action are done under 
color of state law and appellee's employees acting in concert with the state 
actor police in bringing about torts and violation of civil rights. 
F. FERPA 
Appellant injury based on violation of 20 USCS § 1232g, the Family 
Education Right to Privacy Act (FERPA) exists. Where an institution of 
higher learning receives government assistance either direct or via students 
that receive government aid, that institution is required to abide by FERPA. 
This means confidential student information can not be given out without the 
student's permission. Student disciplinary information is held to be within 
the scope of FERPA. See United States v Miami Univ. 91 F Supp 2d 1132 
(SD Ohio 2000). (Government was entitled to permanent injunction to 
prohibit universities1 future violations of 20 USCS § 1232g, where 
government showed that universities had violated statute by releasing 
student disciplinary records containing personally identifiable information 
without prior consent of students or their parents, since this was only 
adequate remedy available and harm to third parties that could arise from 
injunction enforcing statute was slight.) 
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Appellant has alleged that private disciplinary information about 
appellant was given out to others (internet site article, fellow classmate) 
without his permission. See Amended Complaint \\ 22-26, 31-33; See 
Complaint (Appendix B) ffif 22-26, 31-33. 
These acts are also of greater severity as far as injuring the appellant 
in light of the previous false arrest and sexual assault complaint, which was 
included in the complaint of the present matter to give greater perspective of 
why the preceding torts have caused great emotional and mental trauma to 
the appellant. 
IV. Trial court missed the Torts issue completely 
The trial court in its Ruling (Appendix C) p. 5 states: "Relief from the 
harassment of police officers was not a term of the parties' agreement." 
Also on p. 5: "In this matter, plaintiff alleges that defendant's failure to 
protect him from the harassment of various police officers has denied him 
the fruits of the parties' agreement". On p. 6 "The Court has already found 
that under the terms of the agreement, defendant had no obligation to protect 
plaintiff from the police officer's alleged harassment"). On p. 6 "Plaintiff, in 
his complaint, attempts to enlarge and expand the terms of the agreement to 
include protection from police harassment." 
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The trial court seemed to miss the point that the acts of the appellee 
were 1) torts and 2) various other torts were committed by non-police as 
tortfeasors, yet the trial court narrows its ruling to police "harassment". 
As shown in part III above, the acts are torts (violation of the law) 
and not simply "harassment". 
The same problem arose in the (second) Ruling (Appendix E) 
(denying reconsideration) p. 3: "Plaintiff suggested that this Court employ 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to imply a contractual obligation 
on the part of Brigham Young University to insure that BYU Police would 
not approach or apprehend plaintiff." 
1. That is not what appellant asked the court to do. 
2. There is a difference between "approaching or apprehending" 
appellant and false imprisoning him or violating the unreasonable seizure 
clause of the 4 amend, of the U.S. Constitution. Appellee's police have 
done much more than approach or apprehend him. Apprehend seems to 
denote that appellant has done something worthy of being arrested. In 
Appellant's complaint, nowhere are there any facts to imply or denote that 
appellant did anything worthy of being apprehended or false imprisoned. 
Appellant has also shown defamation as a contributing factor to the 
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injury to his right to enjoy the contract. When a student's reputation is 
damaged in the eyes of fellow peers it harms the educational experience. 
3. Further the complaint is not limited to police conduct. For 
example, the Amended Complaint/Complaint sets forth the facts necessary 
for causes of action of Defamation fflf 13-20,22-26; Breach of 
Confidentiality ^ 31-33; Family Education and Right to Privacy Act 
violations ^J 22-26, 31-33 which are attributable to acts by non-police. See 
also Complaint (Appendix B) Defamation | f 13-20,22-26; Breach of 
Confidentiality fflf 31-33; Family Education and Right to Privacy Act 
violations fflf 22-26, 31-33. Reference to any of these acts are noticeably 
omitted from the Rulings. 
Other students similarly situated are not singled out for false 
imprisonment, defamatory articles or have security approach their 
classmates and start a character assault on them. 
Trail court appears to have read the complaint in a light very favorable 
to the appellee. 
IV. Trial court missed the Injure element completely 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. has as an element for breach of Good Faith 
and Fair dealing either 1) an injury to, or 2) destroying of, a parties right to 
receive the benefits of the contract. 
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The original Ruling pp. 4-5 states: "Plaintiff did not allege that 
defendant has failed to fulfill its obligation under this agreement; plaintiff 
has been allowed to enroll in classes." Appellant did not allege a total 
breach {destruction) of the contract. Appellant did allege that he has been 
injured in the right to receive the fruit of the contract. Under St. Benedict fs 
Dev. Co. either a destruction of the right or injury to the right is actionable. 
Appellant has alleged injury. The trail court completely omitted the injury 
to the right to enjoy the contract element of St. Benedict's Dev. Co. 
V. Lack of Administrative Oversight/Deliberate indifference 
The other compelling issue regarding the torts committed by the 
appellee is the fact that the administration is uninterested and unable to 
obviate the torts and their future commission. See Amended Complaint fflf 
36-37. See also Complaint (Appendix B) f 36. 
This should also support the theory of breach of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
VI. The case is actionable on the Contract 
A cause of action on the contract or in tort can arise for injury 
resulting out of contractual relations. See Torts, p. 399-400. 
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The facts of this case allow for a cause of action on the contract. This 
is especially true as appellant has shown a breach of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
VII. Amendment of Complaint 
Appellant maintains the original complaint sufficiently stated a cause 
of action on the contract. Appellant's complaint should be considered in a 
light most favorable to him and if reasonable inferences are drawn 
therefrom, the case should be allowed to proceed. 
The amended complaint mainly uses slightly different wording to 
characterize the facts to emphasize the validity of the case such as that the 
acts of the appellee constituted torts. Two additional false imprisonment 
incidents are included - which could be excluded if necessary. 
Amending of the complaint could be allowed if a cause of action on 
the contract has been shown. 
Conclusion & Relief Sought 
Appellant's right to the benefits of the contract has been injured. 
Appellant has been defamed by appellee on two occasions which damaged 
his reputation among the student body and faculty, caused emotional distress 
and injured and damaged the fruits of the contract and the enjoyment 
thereof. 
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Appellant has been singled of by appellee's police for false 
imprisonment on numerous occasions. This has injured the right to benefit 
from the contract as Appellant does not (and should not) want to suffer tort 
against him simply by being on campus. 
Appellant has had violation of confidentiality committed by a security 
guard who works under the police approaching a classmate, former 
roommate and friend in a computer lab and beginning a character attack on 
appellant, highly disrupting appellant's ability to study and succeed in his 
schoolwork and destroying a friendship. 
The administration of appellee is uninterested and unable to prevent 
these torts against appellant. 
The criteria outlined in for breach of good faith and fair dealing in St. 
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp. is satisfied. 
The trial court ruling dismissing the case should be reversed. 
Respectfully, 
H 
DATED yi August, 2003. 
Aaron Raiser 
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I certify that a true and correct copy of the document was mailed 
n August, 2003 to 
<1 
General counsel (Brigham Young University) 
A-357 ASB 
Provo,84602 
Appendix A. Original Contract 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE 
Aaron Raiser has filed two lawsuits against Brigham Young University, #990400300 and" 
#990400717 in the Fourth District Court in the State of Utah. Raiser and BYU have reached an 
agreement to settle these cases on the following terms and conditions: 
1. Raiser and BYU will execute and file stipulations for dismissal of the lawsuits in 
the form set forth as Exhibit A to this Agreement. 
2. BYU will permit Raiser to register to audit up to a total often courses offered by 
BYU in the Spring or Summer term of any year starting with 2000 and ending in 
2009. BYU will waive all tuition costs, but Raiser will pay for books and 
supplies. If a course Raiser wishes to audit is filled prior to his registration, BYU 
shall have no obligation to increase enrollment to accommodate Raiser's desire to 
audit the class. 
3. Raiser hereby releases BYU from all claims and causes of action of every kind 
whatsoever he has or may have against BYU, its employees, officers and trustees, 
including but not limited to the claims and causes of action embodied in the 
lawsuits described above. This Release includes all claims, known and unknown 
existing on the date of this agreement. BYU hereby releases Aaron Raiser from 
all claims and causes of action it has or may have against him. This Release 
includes all claims known and unknown on the date of this agreement. 
4. This agreement is the sole agreement between the parties relating to claims 
against one another and all other agreements written and oral are void. 
DATED this 28th day of July, 1999. 
Aaron Raiser M 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
Alton Wade 
y if Student Life Vice President // 
Appendix B. Original Complaint 
r^K*\\ 7 1 1 / r - i 
482 K. 7 Peaks Blvd 
Prove, Utah 84 606 
aaron^raiserf^yahoo. cc 
pni Q " K oTI*7 /I 
ao: 
In the Fourth District Court, State of Utah 
Aaron Raiser 
Plaintiff 
v, 
Erigham Young University 
Defendant 
Complaint 
civil «.o.02tft 03H"-t 
uuaae; H 
Plaintiff complains against defendant and for causes 
of action alleges as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County 
2. Defendant is a corporation organized and existing 
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah. At all times 
relevant hereto, was authorized to and was doing business in 
Utah County, Sate of Utah. 
3. This Court nas jurisdiction over this matter because 
tne amount in controversy exceeds $8,00C, exclusive of costs. 
4. Venue is proper in this county pursuant to U.C.A. 
78-13-4. 
ALLEGATIONS RELEVENT TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELEIF 
Pace 1 
5. On or about 2£ July, 1999, Plaintiff 
and Brigham Young University reached an out-of-court settlement 
in cases 990400300 and 990400717 in this court. See Appendix E. 
6. The basis for the complaints had been extreme misuse 
of police authority and power at BYU and abuse and harassment 
misusing that authority towards plaintiff. 
Breach of Contract 
7. Defendant has breached said contract for 
a lack of good faith in providing an atmoshpere 
free of abuse and civil rights violations where plaintiff can 
attend and concentrate on his studies and not be inflicted with 
emotional and mental stress and pain due to illegal activities 
of its employees towards plaintiff. 
8. To understand the emotional and mental stress and pain 
plaintiff has suffered at the hands of the defendant the court 
needs to understand the difficulties plaintiff has had with 
defendant in tne"""past." 
The facts as alleged in the previous two lawsuits 
complaints were not trivial. 
9. If defendant can not accept these 
as having merit, the facts alleged can be shown as being true 
at court as they relate to the purposes of the present 
complaint. 
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9. Plaintiff accepted the settlement agreement assuming 
that such conduce of the police against plaintiff would cease. 
10. Plaintiff specifically spoke with Hal Visick, BYU 
general councel about said conduct and Hal Visick stated he 
spoke with the police about the matter and based on the 
conversation with BYU general counsel plaintiff felt that 
the abuse would stop. This was also conveyed to plaintiff 
by Alton Wade, vice president of student life. 
11. It was somthing plaintiff did not feel necessary 
to get in writing concerning the termination of the abuse 
on the part of the police as it was somthing they should, by law, 
be doing anyway. 
12. Plaintiff also spoke with the President Bateman and he 
also conveyed that the ciorcumstances regarding the previous 
lawsuits should be forgiven and forgotten and Plaintiff 
felt that this meant the police would also take a forgive 
and forget approach i.e. treat Plaintiff as any other person 
or alumnus. 
13. However, on or about September of 1999, the police 
wrote an defamatory article, an article that was admittedly false, 
about plaintiff.. 
14. Said article appeared in the school's Daily Universe 
newspaper. 
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15- Said scared that the police had recievec a police 
call from a student at Wymount Terrace stating she saw a suspicious 
person at the Wymounz chapel. While the police did not 
find plaintiff at the chapel they jumped to the conclusion ir was 
him and wrote an article describing the 
car plaintiff drives; printed the exact stats 
off his drivers license and then proceeded to warn the 
reader to aviod this person. 
16:, Not everyone shares the opinion of the police regarding 
the plaintiff. For example (plaintiff would prefer not to mention 
it but it maybe helps to understand), after a fireside plaintiff 
went to speak with president Bateman and the first thing he said 
to plaintiff after he introduced himself was that 
Eugene Bramhall sure did have a high opinion of plaintiff. 
Eugene Bramhall used to be their general counsel. 
17. Plaintiff explained the incident to school president, 
Merril Bateman, and he seemed to agree with plaintiff that the 
article was without basis and inappropriate. 
19. While not mentioning plaintiff by name, police 
admitted they were reffering to plaintiff. Alton Wade, 
vice president of student life at the time made the police print 
a retraction of the article that appeared in the school paper 
on the last day of Winter semester 199S. 
20. This article was defamatory as it was not true 
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and enough people wouic have associatec plaintiff witn the person 
in m e article ioaseo on the description, inducing two former 
members of plaintiff's byu ware. 
21. Tne incioent was extremely traumatice anc emotionally 
stressful. 
22. Another defamatory incident occurred on or 
about September 2000. 
23. The September 2000 incident occurrea when tne BYU 
police gave the Daily Universe false and misleading information 
about plaintiff which information got published on the school 
newspaper web site and came within 1 hr. of printed publication. 
24. The main falsehood, and there were many, was that 
Plaintiff had been convicted of criminal tresspassing at BYU, 
said information obtained from the BYU police. 
25. Plaintiff discovered the article prior to 
print publication and called Mr. Orme from the general 
counsel's office at home at 8 pm or so who had it stopped. 
Plaintiff also called Eugene Bramhall from general 
counsel's office and Nick Smith, a former Bishop, born having 
first hand information that the article was false ano tney also 
helped. 
26. The incioent was traumatic for the plaintiff ne 
has attended BYU and felt aerired for no genuine purpose 
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ana trie article was about tnree full internet pages ana 
people from BYU working directly across from plaintiff at r.is 
place of employment as a software engineer brought m e school 
newspaper to work. 
27. Plaintiff attempted to rake the forgive and forget 
approach to the defendant's conduct in (8) - (26). 
28. Plaintiff returned to Brigham Young University 
spring of 2002. 
29. Plaintiff was stopped or detained by 
BYU police on three occasions without cause. 
(a) On or about May 19, 2002, Plaintiff was walking on 
campus at about 11:15 pm when he was stopped by a night security 
person who said: non students could be en campus as long as they 
were not inside the buildings, students could be in the buildings 
anytime. Plaintiff was outside at the time and secerity never 
bothered finding out if he was a student or not and called the 
police on him for simply walking on campus. Plaintiff was then 
detained by a BYU police officer. 
(b) On or about May 26, 2002 Plaintiff was walking throu 
the chemistry building. Said chemistry building was open and the 
hallway was legally accesible by all students. 
Plaintiff was sighted by security and 
for merely walking through the ouiiaing as a student immediately 
hac tne police called on him. 
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Fiaintiff could here the person calling on the radio 
after passing Plaintiff that he spotted someone looking like 
Aaron Raiser and then followed Plaintiff continually 
calling police to update his position. 
Plaintiff ran out of patience with him and asked him why 
he was being followed and then told him he was a student. 
A police officer arrived and Plaintiff asked him why this 
had happened to him and the officer responded that security 
had been instructed to report Plaintiff on sight to the police. 
This even though Plaintiff was a student doing nothing 
other than being on campus. 
(c) Plaintiff was stopped on June 2, 2002 on the sidewalk 
of the chemistry building for as someone reported a person walking 
through the chemistry building. The chemistry building 
was open. This time however after being 
stopped the_cf_ficer said iJhat they .had-instructed personnel--to 
question anyone not belonging in the area to the police 
and report them if they were not chemistry majors etc. 
Based on statements of the officer, BYU police had issued an 
advisory for chemistry building personnel to specifically 
report Plaintiff [or someone similar] to police. 
Plaintiff asked police officer if he was being aetained. 
Police Officer said no. Plaintiff asked if he could leave. 
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Police Officer sale no: until tney nac talKec. After talking 
and allowing Flaintiff re go a seconc officer e^pt celling 
3 or 4 times ic Plaintiff that he was "stuck up". TLis was cone 
in a taunting manner without basis. 
30. Plaintiff gennerally felt singled out and put dov,rn by 
security and the police and did not and does not feel 
comfortable around them based on the numerous abusive experiences 
with them. 
31. On or about 13 June, 2C02, 9:15 pm plaintiff was in 
one of the downstairs TMCE computer labs working on homework when 
one of the security guard who previously had stopped and 
called the police on him without basis came in 
and began visiting with another student. 
Plaintiff left; security guard continued talking to the 
other student who happened to be a former roomate and reasonably 
close friend and began telling Plaintiff's friend about 
all the things the police dispatch had said 
alpout Plaintiff-"itfhen-iie-xeported -Plaintif f 
to police and Plaintiff could hear the conversation from 
outside the lab, former roomate gasping 
in repsonse; security guard having no basis for sharing this 
information with former roomate of Plaintiff and now former friend. 
32. The damage did not stop there as tnis friena 
was in the same class as Plaintiff and the emotional damage 
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and discomfort between the two, and with the 
anger Plaintiff felt towards the security 
guaro, was such that Plaintiff requested from the instructor 
taking the final exam for the class at 3:00 pm outside of class 
instead of in class at 5 pm to be able tc concentrate on the exam. 
33. Plaintiff was and is extremely shook up 
about the incident. 
34. The forementioned incidents along with the 
items in appendix B, Plaintiff beleives there 
is extreme animosity on behalf of police department towards 
plaintiff. 
35. This is not trivial animosity, it is somthing causing 
severe emotinal scarring to the Plaintiff which he can no longer 
withstand and plaintiff does not want to risk subjecting recieving 
again. 
36. Plaintiff did issue a complaint to two the people over 
the police and has heard nothing back from them. Even if they did 
respond Plaintiff has received too many unfulfilled promises 
or expectations from previous administrators in the past and 
is no longer willing or able tc continue on with tne 
settlement agreement and release of appendix A. 
37. Defendant has not excercisec gooc faith 
and fair aealing in their part of the agreement. 
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38. The value of the agreement at today's date is 
according zc BYU publication: 
($214 / credit hour) x 40 credit hour = $8560; 
Plaintiff, relying on, and anticipating taking said 
classes for career or personal enhancement, if taking said 
classes at another university would incur the cost. 
39. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 38 above as if set forth in full at this 
point. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELEIF 
(BREACH OF CONTRACT - GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING) 
40. Plaintiff and Defendant did enter into a 
settlement agreement and release on 28 July, 1999. 
41. Plaintiff has fulfilled his part of said 
agreement. 
42. Defendant has breached their covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in fulfilling their part of said 
agreement. 
43. Defendant has shown a willful failure to respond to 
plain, well-understood statuatory or contractual obligations. 
in creating or allowing to exist an atmosphere of 
abuse towards plaintiff; an atmosphere in which plaintiff can 
not study or function free of said abuse; causing a loss cf the 
value of said contract to the plaintiff. 
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44. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 43 above as if set forth in full at this 
point. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELEIF 
(BREACH OF CONTRACT - MISREPRESENTATION) 
45. Plaintiff had filed two complaints against defendant 
resulting from severe police abuse towards Plaintiff. 
46. Plaintiff did enter into a settlement 
agreement and release on 28 July, 1999 with and Defendant 
contingent upon a commitment on the part of Defendant that said 
police abuse would cease. 
47. Plaintiff specifically asked if said abuse prior to 
signing said settlement agreement and was told that it would by 
Defendant's general counsel, Hal Visick. 
48. Plaintiff was further told or led to beleive by 
the school president and vice president of student life 
that both,sides were to take a forgive and forget approach to 
the past incidents which also led plaintiff to beleive that 
the police abuse would cease. 
49. Said police abuse has not ceased in violation 
of plain, well-understood statuatory or contractual obligations, 
creating an atmosphere of abuse towards plaintiff; 
an atmosphere in which plaintiff can not study 
or function free of said abuse; causing a loss of the 
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value of said contract to the plaintiff; anc causing a loss of 
opportunity to litigate cases 990400300 and 990400717 and 
obtain damages therefrom. 
50. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 4 9 above as if set forth in full at this 
point. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELEIF 
(BREACH OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT) 
51. Plaintiff and Defendant did enter into a 
settlement agreement and release on 28 July, 1999. 
52. Plaintiff has fulfilled his part of said 
agreement and as a result did stipulate for dismissal 
(with prejudice) cases 990400300 and 990400717. 
53. Defendant has breached their covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in fulfilling their part of said 
agreement and as a result has BREACHED THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 
Defendant -has -shown- a willful fail-u-re to --respond to 
plain, well-understood statuatory or contractual obligations. 
54. Said violation of plain, well-understood statuatory or 
contractual obligations has created an atmosphere of 
abuse towards plaintiff; an atmosphere in which plaintiff 
can not study or function free of said abuse; causing a loss 
of the value of said contract to the plaintiff; and causing 
a loss of opportunity to litigate cases 990400300 and 990400717 and 
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obtain damages therefrom. 
55. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained 
paragraphs 1 through 54 above as if set forth in full at this 
point. 
ON PLAINTIFFS FIRST SECOND AND THIRD CLAIM FOR RELEIF 
1. For Damages of $8560; 
OR in the Alternative 
For rescision of said contract AND by ORDER of THIS COURT 
to permitt the originally settled cases to go to trial; 
2. For costs of suit; 
3. For such further relief as the Court deems proper under 
the curcumstances. 
DATED this 25th day of July, 2002. 
/f/7^ 
Aaron Raiser, Provo, Utan 
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Aaron Raiser, Pro Se ffa vyJHri1* 
504 N. 7 Peaks Blvd apt 105 " / ^  ' 
Provo, Utah 84606 ^'SO 
In the Fourth District Court, State of Utah 
Aaron Raiser 
Plaintiff 
v. 
Brigham Young University 
Defendant 
Complaint 
Civil No. 
Judge: «^/,w S/" 
Plaintiff complains against defendant and for causes of 
action alleges as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County 
2. Defendant is a corporation organized and existing 
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah. At all time relevant 
hereto, was authorized to and was doing business in Utah County, 
Sate of Utah. 
3. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter because 
the amount in controversy exceeds $20,000, exclusive of costs. 
4. Venue is proper in this county pursuant to U.C.A. 
78-13-7. 
ALLEGATIONS RELEVENT TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELEIF 
5. On the night of April 18, 1997, at approximatly 
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9:50 p.m., Plaintiff was transported to Utah 
County Jail under auspices of criminal tresspassing. 
6. Prior to this, Plaintiff was detained by 
Brigham Young University police. Police informed Plaintiff 
that they received a call of someone standing outside the 
Joseph Smith building on campus. 
7. Plaintiff had ail items removed from his pockets 
by police. Upon finding Plaintiff's Driver's lisence 
officer, who was later identified as commanding officer, 
demanded that Plaintiff recite his Social Security number. 
When Plaintiff asked him to get it off driver's lisence, 
commanding officer became inflamed. 
Plaintiff was also put in handcuff's. Officers (Four (4) of 
them were there) were extremely abusive and angry. Three 
of the four did use profane or swear language, 
8. Plaintiff was asked what he was doing on campus. 
Plaintiff told police that it was Sunday and 
campus is for church on Sunday and 
that his ward meets on campus for church. 
He further explained that tithes of members are 
to support church facilities for members to attend church 
and to worship and that he felt he was using church 
facilities for such purposes. 
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(At this time plaintiff was off Brigham Young University 
property. Plaintiff had jogged across a busy street bordering 
campus and was unaware that police were coming to talk to 
him. Further all police had to do was to say they were there 
to talk with Plaintiff before Plaintiff crossed street.) 
9. Police responded angrily that thar wasn't a 
sufficient answer and another officer went around plaintiff 
and tightened handcuffs. Officers began yelling at plaintiff 
that they weren't playing games. 
10. Plaintiff was told if he didn't tell them what 
he was doing on campus he would be taken to jail. 
He responded that he already told them. Officers then 
jerked him to police vehicle yelling at him they wern't 
playing games. Plaintiff responded: ok, ok, ok. And 
again made an attempt to explain what church and Sunday 
are for explaining to them that he had full permission 
to be on campus for church and church related activities. 
11. An example of church related activity could 
be verified by Eugene Bramhall of Brigham Young University 
General Counsel who was Plaintiff's Stake President (an 
ecclesiastical leader) who travelling to meeting early 
one Sunday morning noticed Plaintiff standing by Marriott 
Center and stopped to talk. Plaintiff told him 
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that he was preparing for a talk he was to give later 
that day (i.e. no noisy roomates on campus). 
12. Officers continued to jerk him once again 
to police vehicle angrily yelling they weren't playing games. 
Plaintiff responded: ok, ok, ok. And this time said he 
was going for a walk (which many people do there on Sunday, 
and can it be understood that people can walk and consider 
church/spiritual things at same time). 
13. Officers continued to jerk him once again 
to police vehicle angrily yelling they weren't playing games. 
Plaintiff responded: ok, ok, ok. And this time said he 
was hanging out (which 
can it be understood that people can hang out 
and consider church/spiritual things at same time). 
14. Apparently that satifsied them and they 
gently walked plaintiff away from police vehicle. 
15. Plaintiff further told police that he had 
permission to attend church on Sunday and chuch related 
activities there. 
16. Plaintiff heard radio dispatch person state 
that Plaintiff had permission to attend church 
and chuch related activities there. 
17. Plaintiff further told/asked police to call his 
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bishop, Nicholas Smith of Alpine Utah, to verify this. 
Plaintiff also told/asked police to call a reliable source 
at Brigham Young University, Eugene Bramhall, who is 
General Counsel to the School's President, that he had 
permission to attend church and church related activities 
on Sunday and that his ward meets on campus* 
18. Plaintiff further told police 
that Dave Thomas, (who working for 
Brigham Young University General Counsel and was serving 
in an official capacity for Brigham Young University) told 
Plaintiff that it was to be left to Plaintiff's "judgement" 
as to when he left on Sunday. 
19. According to Plaintiff's chruch's religious 
beleifs and doctrine, he was using church 
facilities appropriately. 
Plaintiff, if he had been dissallowed 
to attend church on campus, should have been notified of 
any change in permission and been allowed to 
conform to such before being sent to jail. 
20. At this point Plaintiff had already had "pat down" 
perfomed on him by police. 
21. One officer said to Plaintiff: "How do we know you 
are not a pervert". Plaintiff was then sexually assaulted 
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by police officer of Brigham Young University: 
Officer performed "second" pat down, this time breifly touching 
Plaintiff's upper right arm, upper left arm, then placed his 
right hand on Plaintiff's private parts, and with extreme 
force pushed on plaintiffs private parts, moved his hand slowly 
across plaintiffs private parts pushing with force. Plaintiff 
looked over at officer while his hand was on his private parts 
and officer had an expression on his face as if to be feeling 
for somthing. 
The time officer had his hand directly on plaintiff's 
private parts was approximately 4 seconds. 
22. Plaintiff previously has been inproperly 
detained in past at Brigham Young University 
by seargent Richard Decker who has had a long 
running dislike towards Plaintiff and has made his 
dislike present to others on Brigham Young University 
police. 
23. Plaintiff was told he would be taken to his home 
by police, was put in police vehicle and was there by himself 
for approximately 5 minutes.- Police then consulted amongst 
selves and person/people at police station on campus then 
told him he was going to jail. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELEIF 
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(WRONGFUL ARREST) 
24. Plaintiff was arrested by Brigham Young University 
security and taken to jail for alleged Criminal Tresspassing. 
25. Plaintiff had complete permission to be on campus 
Sundays for church and church related activities. Plaintj 
maintains the church institution that 
sponsers Brigham Young University has his complete support 
that he was using church facilities which his, tithe 
supports for appropriate church/religious activity. 
Plaintiff was further told by Dave Thomas, who 
was speaking in a representative capacity of 
Brigham Young University and had 
complete autority from Brigham Young University 
to speak as such, that it was left 
to plaintiff's judgement as to when he left on Sunday. 
Brigham Young University security had no legal basis 
for taking him to jail. The information that he had 
permission to be present 
on campus is in direct contradiction of the officer's 
surmise that he had no permission to be on campus. 
26. Criminal Tresspassing charge was subsequently 
dismissed at request of Defendant. 
27. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in 
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paragraphs 1 through 26 above as if set forth in full at this 
point. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELEIF 
(FALSE IMPRISONMENT) 
28. Plaintiff was arrested by Brigham Young University 
security and taken to jail for alleged Criminal Tresspassing. 
The Defendant intentionally acted to confine 
Plaintiff; Defendant's actions resulted in the jailing of 
Plaintiff. 
29. Plaintiff had complete permission to be on campus 
Sunday for church and church related activities. Plaintiff 
maintains the church institution that 
sponsers Brigham Young University has his complete support 
that he was using church facilities which his tithe 
supports for an appropriate church/religious activity. 
Plaintiff was further told by Dave Thomas, who 
was speaking in a representative capacity of 
Brigham Young University and had 
complete autority from Brigham Young University 
to speak as such, that it was left 
to plaintiff's judgement as to when he left on Sunday. 
Thus, Brigham Young University acted 
having no reasonable grounds to take Plaintiff taken to jail. 
The information that he had permission to be present 
Page % 
on campus is in direct contradiction of the officer's 
surmise that he had no permission to be on campus. 
30. Criminal Tresspassing charge was subsequently 
dismissed at request of Defendant, who acknowledged that 
they had acted, or may have acted inproperly. 
31. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 30 above as if set forth in full at this 
point. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELEIF 
(MALICIOUS PROCECUTION) 
32. Brigham Young University security were aware 
they had no basis for his arrest. In arresting Plaintiff, 
Brigham Young University initiated a criminal proceeding against 
Plaintiff. 
33. Plaintiff was taken to jail 
due to malice on behalf of police present and 
to directly or indirectlly appease/satisfy 
seargent Richard Decker who 
has had a long running dislike towards Plaintiff. 
34. Criminal Tresspassing charge was subsequently 
dismissed at request of Defendant, who acknowledged that 
they had acted, or may have acted inproperly. Probable 
cause, based on information in posession 
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of Brigham Young University did not constitute probable 
cause for i n i t i a t i n g criminal proceeding against him; 
said information contradicting the notion there was 
cause for i n i t i a t i n g said criminal proceeding. 
35. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 34 above as if set forth in full a t th is 
point. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELEIF 
(SEXUAL ASSAULT) 
36. Plaintiff had "second" pat down done on him. 
37. The manner in which officer touched Plaintiff's 
private parts, the pressure exerted, 
the length of time spent doing so 
and the fact that officer 
said "How do we know you are not a pervert" prior to his action; 
such action can in no way be construed as a pat down. 
38. A Citizen has right not to have another person 
forcefully impose themselves on onother persons private parts. 
39. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 38 above as if set forth in full at this 
point. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELEIF 
(UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE) 
40. Plaintiff had "second" pat down done on him. 
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41. The manner in which officer touched Plaintiff's 
private parts, the pressure exerted, the 
length of time spent doing so 
and the fact chat officer 
said "How do we know you are not a pervert" prior to his action; 
such action can in no way be construed as a pat down. 
42. Constitution of United States of America 
protects against unreasonable search and seizure. 
43. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 42 above as if sen forth in full at this 
point. 
ON PLAINTIFFS FIRST AND SECOND CLAIM FOR RELEIF 
1. For Damages of $100,000; 
2. For costs of suit; 
3. For such further relief as the Court deems proper under 
the curcumstances. 
ON PLAINTIFFS THIRD CLAIM FOR RELEIF 
1. For Damages of $25,000; 
2. For costs of suit; 
3. For such further relief as the Court deems proper under 
the curcumstances. 
ON PLAINTIFFS FOUTH AND FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELEIF 
1. For Damages of $1,500,000; 
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2. For costs of suit; 
3. For such further relief as the Court deems proper under 
the curcumstances. 
DATED this 4th day of March, 1999. 
Aaron Raiser, Provo, Utah 
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Aaron Raiser, Pro Se 
504 N. 7 Peaks Blvd apt 105 
Provo, Utah 84606 
in the Fourth District Court, State of Utah 
Aaron Raiser } Complaint 
Plaintiff } 
v. } 
} Civil No. 990400300 
Brigham Young university } 
Defendant } Judge: Burningham 
Plaintiff complains against defendant and for causes 
of action alleges as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County 
2. Defendant is a corporation organized and existing 
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah. At all times 
relevant hereto, was authorized to and was doing business in 
Utah County, Sate of Utah. 
3. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter because 
the amount in controversy exceeds $20,000, exclusive of costs. 
4. Venue is proper in this county pursuant to U.C.A. 
78-13-7. 
ALLEGATIONS RELEVENT TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELEIF 
5. In or about the month of June, 1997, Brigham 
Young University engaged in slanderous conduct 
against Aaron Raiser of Provo, Utah; Brigham 
Young university and it's designated agent(s) having been 
informed by Mr. Raiser that the statements they were 
making were false. 
6. The statements in question were made to 
Chris Mathews of Alpine, Utah, by Mark Gotberg, who was 
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employeed by Brigham Young University and was acting for 
and in behalf of Brigham Young university. 
7. The defamatatory statements are based upon a 
falsified police report by the Brigham Young University 
police wherein the report accuses Mr. Raiser of tresspassing 
on Brigham Young University property, while such a 
falsified report normally would be confidential, a designated 
representative of Brigham Young University 
namely Mark Gotberg, disseminated that falsified report 
to Mr. Mathews for the purpose of casting Mr. Raiser as 
one of questionable character. 
8. The tresspassing claim is from a June 1996 
incident at the Brigham Young University. Job listing 
are posted at the Abraham Smoot building. Alumni are offered 
an (written) invitation to use those listings in their persuit 
of employement. A snack room is located next to a 
wall with job postings. A few minutes after entering 
the Abraham Smoot building a police officer entered, 
and at two times during a supposedly non-police 
visit, Mr. Raiser was told that he could remain in 
snack room. The officer then went to the police room and 
wrote Mr. Raiser up for tresspassing. 
The officer in question on a previous occasion 
had falsly accused Mr. Raiser of breaking 
into Mr. Raiser's car, was undercover, did not identify 
himself or purpose when attempting to question Mr. Raiser 
and then could not find his I.D. (at the time) after he 
did finnally identify himself. He then 
detained Mr. Raiser for about 30 minutes with no legal basis. 
9. Mr. Mathews is a close friend of Mr. Raiser. He 
has and continues to associate with Mr. Mathews on a 
church basis and has dealt with Mr. Mathews on a business 
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basis. Such false statements have put considerable 
strain on the above mentioned relationship and has 
cost Mr. Raiser in mental and emotional grief and 
could impact any future business dealings he has 
with Chris Mathews. 
10. Mr. Raiser has offered witnesses to corraborate 
the fact that he was not tresspassing, including a member of 
Brigham Young university police. Such opportunity was rejected. 
11. The school president, Merril Bateman, vice president 
Alton wade, and Dave Thomas from the school's legal counsel were 
aware what Mr. Raiser had refuted the tresspassing claim. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELEIF 
(DEFAMATION -- Against Defendant) 
12. Plaingiff incorporates the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 11 above as if set forth in full at this 
point. 
ON PLAINTIFFS FIRST CLAIM FOR RELEIF 
1. For Damages of $125,000; 
2. For costs of suit; 
3. For such further relief as the Court deems proper under 
the curcumstances. 
DATED this 1st day of February, 1999. 
/M^ Aaron Raiser, Provo, Utah 
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APPEND 
E L 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE 
Aaron Raiser has filed two lawsuits against Bngham Young Univusity, ^^90400300 and' 
^990400717 in the Fourth District Court in the State of Utah. Raiser and BYUhivf rnifhrd an 
aereeraent to settle these cases on the following terms and conditions: 
1. Raiser and BYU u ill execute and file stipulations for dismissal of the lawsuits in 
the form set forth as Exhibit \ to this Agreement. 
2. BYU will permit Raiser to register to audit up to a total often courses offered by 
BYU in the Spring or Summer term of any year starting with 2000 and ending in 
2009. BYU w ill waive all tuition costs, but Raiser will pay for books and 
supplies If a course Raiser wishes to audit is filled prior to his registration, BYU 
shall have no obligation to increase enrollment to accommodate Raiser's desire to 
inulit the class. 
3. Raiser hereby releases BYU from all claims and causes of action of every kind 
whatsoever he has or may have against BYU, its employees, officers and trustees, 
including but not limited to the claims and causes of action embodied in the 
lawsuits described above. This Release includes all claims, known and indent wn 
existing on the date of this agreement. BYU hereby releases Aaron Raiser fie m 
all claims and causes of action it has or may have against him. This Release 
includes all claims known and unknown on the date of this agreement. 
4. This agreement is the sole agreement bttwttn the parties relating to t iaims 
acainst one another and all other agreements written and oral are void. 
DATED this 28th day of July, 1999. 
dll^ 
Aaron Raiser 
BRIGHAM YjOUNG l^NIVERSITY 
V 
Alton Wade 
Student Life Vice President 
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H E F O U R T H JUDICIAL DISTRICT C 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AARON RUSH?. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TK!t : I i A M 
Ruling 
CASE NO. 020403144 
:n • M Y 
Defendanl 
Judse Guv R. Burningham 
This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and plaintiffs Motion 
for Enlargement of Time. Neither party has requested oral arguments on the motions. After 
reviewing the file, nieniuraikLu and arguments of the parties, the Court enters the following 
ruling. 
PROCEDURAL FACTS 
-']-) "uly 25. 2002, plaintiff, Aaron Raiser ("plaintiff'), filed his complaint alleging the 
following causes of action: 
a. Breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
b. Breach of contract - misrepresentation 
c. Breach of settlement agreement 
2 On Septembei 26, 2002, defendant Bri.glia.rii \ oi n lg I Jn.iversi.ty ("defendant") filed a 
Motion for Stay Pending Removal. 
3, On October 2S\ -002. the Uah Kdeial D^iuU ( ouil i literal an t >'(/f' of fiV' unvl^ 
remanding the case back to this Court. 
1 
4. On December 4, 2002, defendant filed a Motion to Consolidate Actions asking the 
Court to consolidate case no. 020403144 and case no. 020403619. Plaintiff responded to this 
motion on December 23, 2002; however, neither party has noticed this motion for decision. 
5. The parties presented various discovery issues to the Court which were resolved at 
a hearing held on December 13, 2002. 
6. On December 23, 2002, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the case pursuant to 
Utah R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) - failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
7. On January 7, 2002, plaintiff filed a notice of change of address with the Court 
stating that his new address is P.O. Box 4870 Ontario, CA 91761. 
8. On January 24, 2003, plaintiff filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time to answer 
any pending motions of the defendant. 
9. On February 3, 2003, plaintiff filed his response to defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
10. On February 11, 2003, defendants filed their reply memorandum. 
11. Notice to submit defendant's Motion to Dismiss was filed February 15, 2002. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
On April 28, 1999, the parties in this case executed a Settlement Agreement 
("agreement") in which plaintiff agreed to have two cases1, which were pending against defendant 
in the Fourth District Court, dismissed with prejudice. In exchange for dismissing the cases, 
1
 Case numbers 990400300 and 990400717. 
2 
defendant allowed plaintiff to register and enroll in ten coin ses offered by Bi igham Yc i irig 
1 inn fruity nt no expense to the plaintiff. After executing the agreement, both of the cases were 
dismissed. 
DIM if MM ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 
As a preliminary matter. \\w v ;-,urt notes that Jefendaiil dul iuil lik ,111 lijei'tiun to 
-'v* :',\T< U/?//,..r /;,/• F/ilarvcmcnt of Time. Therefore, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs motion. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
Legal Standard 
Defendant has asked this Court to dismiss plaintiffs complaint pursuant to Utah 
R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) -failure to state a c^mi \\von WI^L:*:^:.*. \ • . u...ii,v , . . ? ..-
•^
 !
'- *• • iu • !, int, this Court must "construe the complaint in [a] light most favorable to the 
plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor." Mounteer v. L uin 1 \A\ W A L-^-it, 
Co , 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 ( I Jtah 1991) / : V 1« litionallj , 11 1:1 : tic 1 11 :) dismiss may only be granted 
when "there is no set of facts under wliich the [plaintiff] might succeed." Olson 1. Park-Craig-
Plaintiff's First Claim for Relief— Breach of the Settlement Agreement 
In order to sufficiently plead a cLnn iur bundi -i comma. pian.::ii .::ust state tl le 
1
 •" -.• • 1 1 -•••KM 1 \!<:h\! '• •' - ^ -\c rarty seeking recovery performed under the 
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contract; (3) that the other party breached the contract; and (4) that the non-breaching party 
suffered damages. Bair v. Axiom Design, 2001 UT 20 f 14, 20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 2001). 
In this matter, plaintiff claims that various Brigham Young University employees made 
oral representations promising plaintiff relief from police harassment. Plaintiff asserts that these 
promises were an integral part of the agreement, and that defendant has breached the agreement 
by its failure to protect him from police officers' alleged physical, emotional, and sexual 
harassment. 
When interpreting the terms of an contract, a court must first look within the four 
corners of the document to determine its meaning and the intent of the parties. Central Florida 
Investment, Inc. v Parkwest Assoc, 2002 UT 3, Tf 12, 40 P.3d 599, 605 (Utah 2002). Further, "if 
the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties intentions are 
determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be 
interpreted as a matter of law," and no extrinsic evidence may be introduced to modify the 
meaning of the contract. M (internal citations omitted). 
The Court has reviewed the parties' agreement and finds that it is clear and unambiguous. 
Under the terms of the agreement, plaintiff agreed to have two pending suits against defendant 
dismissed. In exchange, defendant allowed plaintiff to enroll and audit up to ten courses at the 
university Plaintiff did not allege that defendant has failed to fulfill its obligation under this 
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agreement; plaintiff has been allowed to enroll in classes. Kcnci iro;;; ,:ic iiaaissiiient t»l polk c 
officers \\iib nul h'mi I'lhr piirfics1 agreement. 
Additionally, the agreement contains an integration clause which states, "This agreement is 
the sole agreement between the parties ;.:,:/ . .*• .:• : inilin \\u\ ill ther 
agreemenis w i'iit< n and oral are void." Fliis provision establishes that the agreement was fully 
integrated, and under the parol evidence rule this Court may not consider ux ^negeu .. UUL ;;^ is 
ofthe Brigham -.ii^ . ' ^ •-: " •.i,,r!- •  i- • >-•-< .!i!'- ihe terms of the agreement - to do so 
would be a violation of clear contract interpretation rules. Central Florida 40 P.3d at 605. 
Therefore, this Court finals ;l;ai planum i\u< .^.icu ,u >. f:\ • *^  *: : •- • - - • >>" - < n *' i r e a c h 
o f c o n : •'. - ! • rid the Court dismisses plaintiffs third claim for relief 
Breach of ihe Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
It..: v . nk ' • ' 'J ' ' • •' • '' i '•• *•• .*i covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied 
in every contract .S\v 5/, Benedict's Dev. Co, v. Si, Benedict's Hospital. SI1 P.2d !°4 i * iah 
1991), Under i; v .iup.iv.c. covenant ot good faith and fair de alii )g " . h \\ - • ' • lises 
!
 e will not intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other 
party's right to receive the fruits of the contract." ,L;. ... ." .uhi, . •:*' .l\r> *::at 
defendant's failure to pmnvt !iim from the harassment of various police officers has denied him. 
the fruits of the parties' agreement. 
5 
The Court has already found that under the terms of the agreement, defendant had no 
obligation to protect plaintiff from the police officer's alleged harassment. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated that a party's obligations under a contract "cannot be enlarged and expanded by 
means of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to include other promises not fairly 
included in the promise actually made." Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City, 951 
P.2d 735 (Utah 1997). Plaintiff, in his complaint, attempts to enlarge and expand the terms of 
the agreement to include protection from police harassment. As stated above, a party is 
precluded from using the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to expand his or her 
rights under a contract. This is precisely what plaintiff is attempting to do in his first claim for 
relief. Because plaintiff has failed to articulate a valid "fruit of the contract" that defendant has 
denied him under the agreement, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to plead a cause of action 
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Therefore, the Court dismisses 
plaintiffs first claim for relief. 
Breach of Contract -Misrepresentation 
Plaintiff asserts that he entered into the agreement "contingent upon a commitment on the 
part of Defendant that said police abuse would cease." (Plaint's Comp. at 11). Plaintiff alleges 
that the police have continued to harass him in contravention of the agreement. 
After carefully reviewing the terms of the agreement, the Court finds that no assurances, 
promises, or obligations were made by either of the contracting parties which would have 
6 
precluded any police officer from questioning, detaining, or arresting plaintiff As stated earlier 
he ml promises or representations made by any Brigham Young University 
employees are not part of the parties' agreement and may n* i :oi... . ...^ 
of contract, I'lainiiff cannol i\ 1\ on flic ural statements of Brigham Young I Jniversity employees 
as a bases for his claim for relief Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a 
cause of action for brcatn oi c, ;aiau i »: i u r^piv •. n1 • •* ih _;\, the Court 
dismisses plaintiffs second claim for relief 
In conch:; ion. the Court finds that thae is no set ol :acis au.gcu .,i , .... ; ; jt 
unck. * ...i .s ..L - • '••• • , ; "M . ::'.T-- <,. ^ nlaint fails to state a cause of action upon which 
relief can be granted. Therefore, pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), this Court DlbM^-: .. -
plaintiffs complumi a, ^ U;1;*'JL\. .v. a ^ A\. . . dcV^ !:.nt" • * ' ; on to Consolidate is 
he Court orders defendant to prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
^^M^M^^UiWlNGl 
Case No. 020443144 
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Appendix D. Proposed Amended Complaint 
Aaron Raiser, Pro Se 
P.O. Box 4870 
Ontario, Ca 91761 
aaron__raiser@yahoo.com 
In the Fourth District Court, State of Utah 
Aaron Raiser, } Amended Compla in t 
Plaintiff, } 
v. } 
} Civil No. 020403144 
Brigham Young University, } 
Defendant. } Judge: Burningham 
Plaintiff complains against defendant and for causes of action alleges as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County 
2. Defendant is a corporation organized and existing pursuant to the laws of the 
State of Utah. At all times relevant hereto, was authorized to and was doing business in 
Utah County, Sate of Utah. 
3. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter because the amount in controversy 
exceeds $8,000, exclusive of costs. 
4. Venue is proper in this county pursuant to U.C.A. 78-13-4. 
ALLEGATIONS RELEVENT TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELEIF 
5. On or about 28 July, 1999, Plaintiff and Brigham Young University reached an 
out-of-court settlement in cases 990400300 and 990400717 in this court. See Appendix 
1 
B. 
6. The basis for those complaints had been extreme misuse of police authority 
and power at BYU and abuse and harassment misusing that authority towards plaintiff. 
They complaints covered civil rights violations, false imprisonment, false arrest and 
sexual assault. The entire BYU administration was aware of the nature of 
these complaints and plaintiff had written both president Bateman and 
V.P. Wade stating the nature of the complaints. 
Breach of Contract 
7. Defendant has breached said contract for a lack of good faith in providing an 
atmoshpere free of abuse and civil rights violations where plaintiff can attend and 
concentrate on his studies and not be inflicted with emotional and mental stress and pain 
due to illegal activities of its employees towards plaintiff. 
8. To understand the emotional and mental stress and pain plaintiff has suffered 
at the hands of the defendant the court needs to understand the difficulties plaintiff has 
had with defendant in the past. The facts as alleged in the previous two lawsuits 
complaints were not trivial. See appendix B. These are included as if set forth in full 
herein. 
9. If defendant can not accept these as having merit, the facts alleged can be 
shown as being true at court as they relate to the purposes of the present complaint. 
Plaintiff accepted the settlement agreement assuming that such conduct of the 
police against plaintiff would cease. 
10. Plaintiff did not feel it necessary to get in writing concerning the termination 
of the abuse on the part of the police as it was something they should, by law, be doing 
2 
anyway. 
11. Plaintiff specifically spoke with Hal Visick, BYU general counsel about said 
conduct and Hal Visick stated he spoke with the police about the matter and based on the 
conversation with BYU general counsel plaintiff felt that the abuse would stop. This was 
also conveyed to plaintiff after the contract was signed by Alton Wade, vice president of 
student life. 
12. Plaintiff also spoke with the President Bateman after the contract became 
executed and he also conveyed that the circumstances regarding the previous lawsuits 
should be forgiven and forgotten and Plaintiff felt that this meant the police would also 
take a forgive and forget approach i.e. treat Plaintiff as any other person or alumnus. 
13. However, on or about September of 1999, the police wrote a defamatory 
article, an article that was admittedly false, about plaintiff. 
14. Said article appeared in the school's Daily Universe newspaper. 
15. Said stated that the police had received a police call from a student at 
Wyoming Terrace stating she saw a suspicious person at the Wyoming chapel. While the 
police did not find plaintiff at the chapel they jumped to the conclusion it was him and 
wrote an article describing the car plaintiff drives; printed the exact stats off his drivers 
license and then proceeded to warn the reader to "use caution around this person". 
Enough people could associate plaintiff with the person described in the article, including 
two former members of plaintiff s student ward (buy 36th). 
16. Plaintiff explained the incident to school president, Merrill Bateman, and he 
seemed to agree with plaintiff that the article was without basis and inappropriate. 
3 
17. While not mentioning plaintiff by name, police admitted they were referring 
to plaintiff. 
18. Alton Wade, vice president of student life at the time made the police print a 
retraction of the article that appeared in the school paper on the last day of Winter 
semester 1999. 
19. This did not cure the original damage as its print date after 3 1/2 months 
rendered it meaningless along with it being printed during finals. 
20. This article was defamatory as it was not true and enough people would have 
associated plaintiff with the person in the article based on the description, including two 
former members of plaintiff s byu ward. 
21. The incident was extremely traumatic and emotionally stressful. It showed 
that the police were definitively out to get and demean plaintiff in the eyes of those that 
would read the article. Said police have never resorted to guessing at suspects when 
printing their articles. Such conduct is also a denial of equal protection of law as the 
police, acting under color of state law, do not do such things to others similarly situated. 
22. Another defamatory article was published about plaintiff by the school's 
newspaper staff on their internet cite and was to be printed in the Daily Universe 
occurred on or about September 2000. 
23. The September 2000 incident occurred when the BYU police gave the Daily 
Universe false and misleading information about plaintiff which information got 
published on the school newspaper web site and came within 1 hr. of printed publication. 
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24. The main falsehood, and there were many, was that Plaintiff had been 
convicted of criminal trespassing at BYU, said information obtained from the BYU 
police. This was defamatory by law. 
25. Plaintiff discovered the article prior to print publication and called Mr. Orme 
from the general counsel's office at home at 8 pm or so who had it stopped. Plaintiff also 
called Eugene Bramhall from general counsel's office and Nick Smith, a former Bishop, 
both having first hand information that the article was false and they also helped. The 
article was also a sign that the defendant and their police single plaintiff out for such 
treatment as others similarly situated are not treated that way. Such conduct is also a 
denial of equal protection of law as the police, acting under color of state law, do not do 
such things to others similarly situated. 
26. The incident was traumatic for the plaintiff he has attended BYU and felt 
derided for no genuine purpose and the article was about three full internet pages and 
people from BYU working directly across from plaintiff at his place of employment as a 
software engineer brought the school newspaper to work. The incident was also a 
violation of the Federal Family and Educational Right to Privacy Act. 
27. Plaintiff attempted to take the forgive and forget approach to the incidents in 
(8) - (26). 
28. Plaintiff was also false imprisoned by the defendant on other occasions off 
campus. 
(a) On or about October, 2000, plaintiff was sitting in his car north of the 
horticulture science experimental lot (near 800 N. & 630 E.) and was ordered to give his 
5 
driver's license or face arrest. Plaintiff was told the BYU police can patrol the borders of 
their property. Officer could cite no laws being broken. 
(b) On or about February, 1998, plaintiff was walking home from work at 1500 
W. 800 N. Provo, when a BYU police officer Packer stopped him for the sole purpose of 
finding out who he was, citing no laws broken, demanding his name and date of birth or 
face having the Provo police called. This was far from BYU property. Officer actions 
were done under color of state law. Plaintiff related the incident to then general counsel 
Eugene Bramhall who had no idea why the officer had been there. 
(c) On or about April, 2002, plaintiff was sitting in his car at the Provo city park 
river trail entrance south of the LDS motion picture studio. It was about 11:30 pm and 
a BYU officer parked his car directly in back of plaintiff s so he could not go anywhere 
and plaintiff asked if he was being detained and officer stated thatplaintiff wasn't going 
anywhere, til he identified himself. The area where plaintiff was at was marked as city 
property and no curfew etc. existed denying the right to be there at that hour. Officer 
could cite no laws being broken. Officer actions were done under color of state law. 
Plaintiff filed a complaint with the BYU police on that 
This conduct is not proper by Brown v. Texas 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (requiring 
police to have an articulated suspicion of a specific crime being committed prior to 
requiring a person to give their identification). 
29. Plaintiff returned to Brigham Young University spring of 2002 as a student. 
Plaintiff was stopped or detained by BYU police on three occasions without cause. 
(a) On or about May 19, 2002, Plaintiff was walking on campus at about 11:15 
pm when he was stopped by a night security person who said: non students could be on 
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campus as long as they were not inside the buildings, students could be in the buildings 
anytime. Plaintiff was outside at the time and security never bothered finding out if he 
was a student or not and called the police on him for simply walking on campus. Plaintiff 
was then detained by a BYU police officer. 
(b) On or about May 26, 2002 Plaintiff was walking through the chemistry 
building. Said chemistry building was open and the hallway was legally accessible by all 
students. 
Plaintiff was sighted by security and for merely walking through the building as a 
student immediately had the police called on him. 
Plaintiff could hear the person calling on the radio after passing Plaintiff that he 
spotted someone looking like Aaron Raiser and then followed Plaintiff continually 
calling police to update his position. 
Plaintiff ran out of patience with him and asked him why he was being followed 
and then told him he was a student. 
A police officer arrived and Plaintiff was then detained, asked him why this had 
happened to him and the officer responded that security had been instructed to report 
Plaintiff on sight to the police. 
This even though Plaintiff was a student doing nothing other than being on 
campus. 
(c) Plaintiff was stopped on June 2, 2002 on the sidewalk of the chemistry 
building for as someone reported a person walking through the chemistry building. The 
chemistry building was open. This time however after being stopped the officer said that 
they had instructed personnel to question anyone not belonging in the area to the police 
7 
and report them if they were not chemistry majors etc. Based on statements of the officer, 
BYU police had issued an advisory for chemistry building personnel to specifically 
report Plaintiff [or someone similar] to police. 
Plaintiff asked police officer if he was being detained. Police Officer said no. 
Plaintiff asked if he could leave. Police Officer said not until they had talked. After 
talking and allowing Plaintiff to go a second officer kept telling 3 or 4 times to Plaintiff 
that he was "stuck up". This was done in a taunting manner without basis. 
30. Plaintiff generally felt singled out and put down by security and the police 
and did not and does not feel comfortable around them based on the numerous abusive 
experiences with them. Such incidents amount no false imprisonment and are an 
unreasonable seizure. Such detainment also violates the Marsh v. Alabama 326 U.S. 506 
holding: 
"Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, 
for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more 
do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional 
rights of those who use it." 
Defendant does open up their property to the public for its benefit for school, 
church and related activities. 
31. On or about 13 June, 2002, 9:15 pm plaintiff was in one of the downstairs 
TMCB computer labs working on homework when one of the security guard who 
previously had stopped and called the police on him without basis came in and began 
visiting with another student. Plaintiff left; security guard continued talking to the 
other student who happened to be a former roomate and reasonably close friend and 
began telling Plaintiffs friend about all the things the police dispatch had said about 
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Plaintiff when he reported Plaintiff to police and Plaintiff could hear the conversation 
from outside the lab, former roomate gasping in response; security guard having 
no basis for sharing this information with former roomate of Plaintiff and now former 
friend. Security guard related to his former roomate that plaintiff had been arrested for 
lewdness involving a child and that plaintiff had been banned from campus among other 
things. There is extreme stigma in hearing someone arrested for something they did not 
do 
and can otherwise prove, which is the case here. Further the incident amounted to 
defamation, putting plaintiff in false light. Plaintiff complained to the V.P. over police 
and no action was taken concerning the incident. The incident was also a violation of the 
Federal Family and Educational Right to Privacy Act. 
32. The damage did not stop there as this friend was in the same class as Plaintiff 
and the emotional damage and discomfort between the two, and the anger Plaintiff felt 
towards the security guard, was such that Plaintiff requested from the instructor 
- taking the final exam for the class at 3:00 pm outside of class instead of in class at 5 pm 
to be able to concentrate on the exam. 
33. Plaintiff was and is extremely shook up about the incident. 
34. The aforementioned incidents along with the items in appendix B5 Plaintiff 
believes there is extreme animosity on behalf of police department towards plaintiff. 
35. This is not trivial animosity, it is something causing severe emotional 
scarring to the Plaintiff which he can no longer withstand and plaintiff does not want to 
risk subjecting receiving again. Plaintiff can not study in an atmosphere where the police 
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and other employees walk around destroying plaintiffs friendships for no reason; in an 
atmosphere where plaintiff is defamed by newspaper articles so other students can hate 
plaintiff; where plaintiff is false imprisoned by the police for no legitimate basis at all; 
where police incite other students to call the police on him for no reason other than 
being on campus as a student breaking no laws. 
36. Plaintiff did issue a complaint to two the people over the police and has heard 
nothing back from them. Even if they did respond Plaintiff has received too many 
unfulfilled promises or expectations from previous administrators in the past and is no 
longer willing or able to continue on with the settlement agreement and release of 
appendix A. 
37. Defendant has not exercised good faith and fair dealing in their part of the 
agreement. Said conduct has constituted legal torts committed by defendant as plaintiff 
has attempted to enjoy the fruit of the contract. Plaintiff has been injured in his right to 
enjoy the fruit of the contract. Plaintiffs right to enjoy the fruit of the contract has been 
injured as plaintiff has been injured. The value and worth of the contract is nothing as 
plaintiff has to suffer purposeful torts committed against him when he goes to enjoy the 
fruits of the contract and the administration does not act to correct the violations of law. 
38. The value of the agreement at today's date is according to BYU publication: 
($214 / credit hour) x 40 credit hour = $8560; 
Plaintiff, relying on, and anticipating taking said classes for career or personal 
enhancement, if taking said classes at another university would incur the cost. 
39. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 38 
above as if set forth in full at this point. 
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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELEIF 
(BREACH OF CONTRACT - GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING) 
40. Plaintiff and Defendant did enter into a settlement agreement and release on 
28 July, 1999. 
41. Plaintiff has fulfilled his part of said agreement. 
42. Defendant has breached their covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
fulfilling their part of said agreement. 
43. Defendant has shown a willful failure to respond to plain, well-understood 
statutory and contractual obligations, in creating or allowing to exist an atmosphere of 
abuse towards plaintiff; an atmosphere in which plaintiff can not study or function free of 
said abuse; causing a loss of the value of said contract to the plaintiff by committing torts 
such as defamation, false imprisonment, putting plaintiff in false light and injuring his 
right to freely enjoy the rights of the contract 
44. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 43 
above as if set forth in full at this point 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELEIF 
(BREACH OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT) 
45. Plaintiff and Defendant did enter into a settlement agreement and release on 
28 July, 1999. 
46. Plaintiff has fulfilled his part of said 
agreement and as a result did stipulate for dismissal 
(with prejudice) cases 990400300 and 990400717. 
47. Defendant has breached their covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in fulfilling their part of said 
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agreement and as a result has BREACHED THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 
Defendant has shown a willful failure to respond to 
plain, well-understood statutory or contractual obligations; causing a loss of the value of 
said contract to the plaintiff by committing torts such as defamation, false imprisonment, 
putting plaintiff in false light and injuring his right to freely enjoy the rights of the 
contract. 
Said violation of plain, well-understood statutory or 
contractual obligations has created an atmosphere of 
abuse towards plaintiff; an atmosphere in which plaintiff 
can not study or function free of said abuse; causing a loss 
of the value of said contract to the plaintiff; and causing 
a loss of opportunity to litigate cases 990400300 and 990400717 and 
obtain damages therefrom. 
48. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 47 above as if set forth in full at this point. 
ON PLAINTIFFS FIRST AND SECOND CLAIM FOR RELEIF 
1. For Damages of $8560; 
OR in the Alternative 
For rescission of said contract AND by ORDER of THIS COURT 
to permit the originally settled cases to go to trial; 
2. For costs of suit; 
3. For such further relief as the Court deems proper under 
12 
the circumstances. 
DATED this 18th day of March, 2003. 
Aaron Raiser 
13 
Appendix A 
1 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE 
Aaron Raiser has filed two lawsuits against Brigham Young University, #990400300 and-
#990400717 in the Fourth District Court in the State of Utah. Raiser and BYU have reached an 
agreement to settle these cases on the following terms and conditions: 
1. Raiser and BYU will execute and file stipulations for dismissal of the lawsuits in 
the form set forth as Exhibit A to this Agreement. 
2. BYU will permit Raiser to register to audit up to a total often courses offered by 
BYU in the Spring or Summer term of any year starting with 2000 and ending in 
2009. BYU will waive all tuition costs, but Raiser will pay for books and 
supplies. If a course Raiser wishes to audit is filled prior to his registration, BYU 
shall have no obligation to increase enrollment to accommodate Raiser's desire to 
audit the class. 
3. Raiser hereby releases BYU from all claims and causes of action of every kind 
whatsoever he has or may have against BYU, its employees, officers and trustees, 
including but not limited to the claims and causes of action embodied in the 
lawsuits described above. This Release includes all claims, known and unknown 
existing on the date of this agreement. BYU hereby releases Aaron Raiser from 
all claims and causes of action it has or may have against him. This Release 
includes all claims known and unknown on the date of this agreement. 
4. This agreement is the sole agreement between the parties relating to claims 
against one another and all other agreements written and oral are void. 
DATED this 28th day of July, 1999. 
Aaron Raiser 
M 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
1/ Alton Wade Student Life Vice President 
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Appendix E. Second Ruling Dismissing Case 
\-TLtzU 
Fourth Juacfc! District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY 
AARON RAISER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, 
Defendants. 
, STATE OF UTAH 
Ruling 
CASE NO. 020403144 
DATE: May 22, 2003 
Judge Burningham 
The matter is before the Court on plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiffs Motion 
to Amend Complaint. The Court having reviewed the file, memoranda and being duly informed 
therefrom, enters the following ruling. 
Procedural History 
1. On March 17, 2003, plaintiff Aaron Raiser ("plaintiff) filed a Motion to Amend 
Complaint. 
2. On March 17, 2003, plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider. 
3. On March 21, 2003, plaintiff filed a second Motion to Amend Complaint. 
4. On March 31, 2003, plaintiff filed an Amended Motion to Amend Complaint.l 
5. On March 31, 2003, defendant, Brigham Young University, filed its Memorandum in 
1
 Plaintiff filed three motions to amend. In the interest of efficiency, all three motions to 
amend will be dealt with as one motion. 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. 
6. On April 1, 2003, defendant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motions to Amend 
Complaint? 
7. On April 17, 2003, plaintiff filed an Objection to Order as Drafted? 
8. On April 17, 2003, plaintiff filed a Response Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion to 
Reconsider. 
9. On April 28, 2003, defendant filed a Reply to Plaintiffs Objection to Proposed Order. 
10. On May 9, 2003, plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Reply Regarding the 
Proposed Order. 
11. Notice to submit plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider and plaintiffs Motion to Amend 
Complaint was filed on April 28, 2003. 
Discussion 
Motion to Amend Complaint 
Plaintiffs original complaint was dismissed by this Court for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. Utah R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A trial court may deny a motion to amend a 
pleading when (1) it is filed after extensive delay, (2) it is filed without adequate justification, 
2
 Brigham Young University addressed plaintiffs various motions to amend in one 
combined memorandum. 
3
 Plaintiffs Objection to Order as Drafted will be considered as part of the Motion to 
Reconsider section of this ruling. 
2 
and (3) after some of the issues have been resolved. Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 56 
P.3d 524 (Utah 2002). 
First, the proposed Amended Complaint does not cure the deficiencies of the original 
complaint, nor does it raise new issues which were unknown to plaintiff at the time he filed his 
original complaint. Assuming the new issues raised by plaintiff in his proposed Amended 
Complaint were unknown to plaintiff at the time, they would not change the outcome of this 
case. The new factual allegations were simply additional episodes of "police harassment" 
completely consistent with the factual allegations stated in the original complaint. Regardless of 
how the Court construes these factual allegations, they do not prove breach of contract on the 
part of Brigham Young University. Therefore, the Motion to Amend Complaint is not adequately 
justified. 
Second, any new allegations were not timely filed in a complaint. The most recent of 
plaintiffs new allegations occurred an entire year before plaintiff filed this Motion to Amend 
Complaint. This Court has the discretion to refuse to accept the amended Complaint after such 
an extensive delay. Further, it would be prejudicial to Brigham Young University to have to 
defend this complaint because no new cause of action is stated and the additional allegations are 
factually similar to those already alleged and are insufficient to prove a breach of contract. 
Third, the issues in this case have been resolved. Plaintiffs complaint was dismissed and 
it is not in the interest of fairness or justice for the Court to revisit these issues. 
3 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint. 
Motion to Reconsider 
A Motion to Reconsider is not provided for in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "and has 
never been recognized as a proper motion in this state." Wisden v. Bangerter, 893 P.2d 340, 342 
(Utah 1980) (citations omitted). Plaintiff cited to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(b) and 59(e) 
as the procedural support for his Motion to Reconsider. Therefore, the Court will consider this 
motion as a Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). Grounds for an 
amended judgment are irregularity in the proceedings of the court, misconduct of the jury, 
accident or surprise, newly discovered evidence, excessive or inadequate damages, insufficiency 
of the evidence to justify the verdict, or an error in law. Utah R.Civ.P. 59. In this case there 
were no irregularities in the proceedings. There was no jury and therefore no misconduct of the 
jury. There was no accident or surprise. As stated before, the new evidence presented is not 
material to this claim and could have been, with due diligence, discovered and presented to the 
Court before the complaint was dismissed. There is no issue as to excessive or inadequate 
damages because this case was dismissed at the pleadings stage. Finally, there was no error in 
law. As a matter of law, plaintiff did not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Plaintiffs Good Faith and Fair Dealing Argument 
Plaintiffs claim that the implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing was breached is 
duly noted. Plaintiff suggested that this Court employ the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
4 
to imply a contractual obligation on the part of Brigham Young University to insure that BYU 
Police would not approach or apprehend plaintiff. However, a party's obligations under a 
contract "cannot be enlarged or expanded by means of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing to include other promises not fairly included in the promise actually made." Jensen 
v. Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City, 951 P.2d 735 (Utah 1997). Despite plaintiffs argument 
that the fact pattern of Jensen does not apply, the legal proposition for which it stands is good 
law and does apply to this case. 
Plaintiffs Objection to the Order 
Plaintiff further objected to the April 4, 2003 Order because "opposing counsel [] 
attempted] to slip in two extra words - page 2 line 2 [-] that disallow plaintiff to pursue justice." 
The Court must assume plaintiff was referring to the words "with prejudice." The complaint was 
dismissed pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P 12(b)(6). Under Utah R.Civ.P. 41(b), an involuntary 
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is assumed to be with prejudice unless the court specifies 
otherwise. Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987, 990-91 (Utah 1997). The Court did not specify 
whether the dismissal was with prejudice and, therefore, the assumption that it was with 
prejudice was properly made. 
Plaintiffs complaint was properly dismissed, with prejudice, pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. The proposed 
Order reflected that holding and this Court DENIES plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. 
5 
Dated at Provo, Utah this ZZday of May, 200: 
* V: ;-"-* ' 
Case No. 020403144 
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